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BOOK REVIEW
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING. By Thomas L. Shaffer. St.
Paul: West Publishing Co., 1976. Pp. ix, 353. $5.95.
Reviewed by James R. Elkins*
One of the most persistent students and critics of the attorney-
client relationship in recent years has been Thomas L. Shaffer,
former Dean and now Professor of Law at Notre Dame University.
Professor Shaffer has consolidated his work on this aspect of legal
practice in Legal Interviewing and Counseling. In his new work
Professor Shaffer focuses on attorney-client decision-making in the
law office and on the factors that enhance and distort the attorney-
client relationship.
The reader should be warned that Professor Shaffer's approach
is one of gentle persuasion, rather than a diatribe against traditional
legal practices. The approach is seductive, because the author pro-
vides practical tools for what amounts to a new paradigm for the
practice of law. These tools are especially useful for guiding students
toward a variety of techniques that allow the student to formulate
satisfactory and helpful ways of relating to their future clients. The
book also serves as a practical guide for the lawyer interested in
structuring a more productive, satisfying, and creative relationship
with clients and provides the theoretical framework within which
such growth can begin. The reader should be warned, however, that
Legal Interviewing and Counseling is more than a pragmatic ap-
proach to interviewing. Professor Shaffer weaves a masterful web
around current counseling and psychology literature and artfully
integrates this scholarship into useful statements about the prob-
lems of relating to clients.
The practice of law generally is viewed in terms of what lawyers
do for clients, such as drafting legal forms, writing briefs, and con-
ducting litigation. The question that concerns Shaffer is how the
lawyer structures the relationship that in turn influences the legal
work the client receives. Looking at the attorney-client relationship
presents law practice in an entirely different perspective. Shaffer
explores the images clients and lawyers carry into the relationship
and how these images shape their respective roles. Legal practice is
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University. B.A., University of
Kentucky, 1967; J.D., 1971; LL.M., Yale University, 1975.
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the result not only of direct interaction between lawyer and client
in the solving of legal problems, but is patterned also on the attor-
ney's perception of the client, the client's problem, the appropriate
role of law in resolving the client's problem, and finally the attor-
ney's self-concept and view of his role in law.' These perceptions
and images determine the lawyer's "world view," which in turn
influences perception and problem-solving. Law and the practice of
law, then, can be viewed as a function of the world view of individ-
ual lawyers and that of the profession as a whole. Shaffer's immedi-
ate concern with the lawyer's world view is the structuring of
attorney-client relationships.
Shaffer initially proposes that traditional notions of fact and
fact relevance are too narrow for productive examination of the
attorney-client relationship. The pigeonholing of facts that ema-
nates from a legalistic world view, the author believes, blinds attor-
neys to a different source of factual data: client and attorney feel-
ings. The attorney's underlying fear is the fear of being "soft." Thus
lawyers eschew emotion and feeling both in themselves and in their
clients, because feeling and intuition are related in the lawyer's
mind to "softness." Clients are "soft;" lawyers are objective and
rational. Clients feel; lawyers think.2 Shaffer suggests that only one
side of the lawyer is the hard, objective, rational being; the comple-
mentary side is the equivalent of the client's feeling, intuitive
"softness." 3
Shaffer begins with a basic premise that "feelings are facts"4
and then demonstrates that the attorney can make use of this fun-
damental proposition. The conceptualization of feelings as facts car-
ries Shaffer to the core of the attorney-client relationship. Tradi-
tionally lawyers have viewed themselves as analytical problem-
solvers who advise clients on such matters as the rights, obligations,
and liabilities imposed by the law and sanctioned by the legal pro-
cess. The main attributes of the lawyer's skills are thought to lie in
problem-solving by conscious, rational, logical, analytical, linear
thought processes.' Shaffer's view of the attorney-client relationship
is substantially different. In his veiw the interpersonal relationship
1. See T. SHAFFER, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 106-08 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as LEGAL INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING].
2. Id. at 60-63.
3. Id. Clients, Shaffer points out, also have a "lawyer" element in their personalities.
4. Id. at 3-7.
5. Lawyers should note the warning, "He who lives solely by intellect, by cognition and
routine, is not only a fool-he is empty and will never create." D. ScHNEIDER, THE PSYCHOANA-
LYST AND THE ARTIST 93 (1950).
[Vol. 30:923
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created in the attorney-client situation consists not only of attorney-
to-client advice, but of a process as well. By "process" Shaffer
means "the feelings of lawyer and client toward one another, and
each toward himself, and all of the ways they act toward one another
which do not pertain in words to the business they transact."' The
process of the interactive setting forms the central core, or the psy-
chodynamics, of the attorney-client relationship.
Shaffer explores the nature of the attorney-client relationship
from an interpersonal perspective, because the psychodynamics af-
fect the ultimate goal of "a mutually satisfactory resolution of the
business which the client brings to the lawyer."7 Results depend
upon how the attorney and client feel about each other and upon
how feelings and perspective are acted out and are acted upon dur-
ing their relationship.
The factors effecting the interaction of attorney and client are
multifaceted, and Shaffer has made an effort to present the interac-
tion in all of its complexity. He finds the interaction to be a function
of:
-rEach party's view of the law. Lawyers tend to regard the law as some-
thing sacred; clients may regard [it] as oppressive, intrusive, or tyranni-
cal.
-Each party's general philosophy of human value ....
-Each party's view of lawyers ....
-Each party's view of the client's situation ....
Shaffer correctly notes that although these socio-psychological fac-
tors are important, they also must be assessed in terms of the envi-
ronment in which they occur.' Thus an understanding of the
attorney-client relationship must go beyond an inquiry into what
occurs between attorney and client to consider where the interaction
occurs.
The underlying thesis of Legal Interviewing and Counseling is
that the practice of law is in part defined by factors and conditions
beyond the immediate awareness of, but accessible to, the lawyer.
The first step in exploring the attorney-client relationship simply is
to gain an awareness of these factors that bear on the interaction
and its outcome.10 Shaffer presents tools and available theories for
6. LEGAL INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING, supra note 1, at 19.
7. Id. at 29.
8. Id. at 106-07; see Redmount, Law as a Psychological Phenomenon, 18 Am. J. oF Jums.
80, 98-99 (1973).
9. LEGAL INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING, supra note 1, at 84-105.
10. A preeminent legal academician of the modem era, Karl Llewellyn, reportedly
believed that all lawyers should have an articulate and coherent working theory of
"lawyering." Llewellyn thought it essential for a lawyer "to understand his situation and his
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gaining a thorough working knowledge of the psychodynamics of
attorney-client interaction." Legal Interviewing and Counseling is
an important resource and guide for achieving increased under-
standing of and raising to conscious awareness the psycho-social
dimensions of legal practice and legal decision-making.,2
Shaffer has used both sociological and psychological concepts
throughout Legal Interviewing and Counseling. The book relies
upon a number of concepts that can be used to study such external
influences on legal practice and decision-making as profession, role,
status identity, and role conflict. A sociological perspective is help-
ful in determining the meaning of being a member of a profession.' 3
Sociologists traditionally have defined professionalism in terms of
the acquired status derived from the study of a body of knowledge
inaccessible to laymen and an organization with emphasis upon
providing public services. 4 The effects of professionalism on legal
practice are pronounced. The "profession" serves to structure legal
role, to clarify his aims and have a general conception of how to set about attaining them,
and to be able to see all this in a broad perspective." W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
REALST MOVEMENT 173 (1973).
11. The task should be initiated during the course of legal education, and Legal Inter-
viewing and Counseling should accelerate that endeavor. The psychodynamics in the
attorney-client relationship also is being exposed to some students in clinical law courses.
Meltsner and Schrag, clinical law teachers at Columbia, have indicated that they attempt
to expose students to intergroup and interpersonal dynamics in the practice of law through
simulations in the clinical law program. They ask students during their participatin in clini-
cal exercises
.. .what is going on between these people or in this group and how does it affect the
work at hand? How is authority vested and responsibility assumed in these encounters?
What covert messages are being communicated, and by what means? The aims of such
inquiry are to clarify and explore both the definitions which students give the roles they
adopt, and the distance they maintain from typical role behavior, to enrich their con-
sciousness of how and what people communicate, and to give the instructors an oppor-
tunity to reinforce role behavior which they want to perpetuate.
Meltsner & Schrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 601 (1976).
12. Shaffer's Legal Interviewing and Counseling is part of a growing body of literature
directed toward the psycho-social dimensions of legal practice. H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE,
PROBLEMS, READINGS AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR (1977); H. FREEMAN &
H. WEIHOFEN, CLINICAL LAW TRAINING; INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1972); A. WATSON, THE
LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING PROCESS (1976); A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR
LAWYERS (1968).
13. Examples of studies of professions from a sociological perspective include E.
HUGHES, MEN AND THEIR WORK (1958); MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 198-223
(M. Rheinstein ed. 1954); W. MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES (1970);
PROFESSIONALIZATION (H. Vollmer & D. Mills eds. 1966); F. ZNANIECKI, THE SOCIAL ROLE OF
THE MAN OF KNOWLEDGE (1940); Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34 (rev. ed. T. Parsons ed. 1954).
14. See A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 11-14 (1968); Shaffer, Christian Theories
of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 721, 733 (1975); Watson, The Lawyer as
Counselor, 5 J. FAM. L. 7, 8 (1965).
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activities and to provide a sense of identity with a larger com-
munity.'5 As David Apter has pointed out,
Professionalization creates a sense of obligation among individuals, which
by becoming moral is therefore much more significant than a simple contract
and more reliable. A feeling of custodianship derives from this professional
form of obligation, for it is the profession, the body of theory, the set of ideas
that contain universals and represent the human intellectual inheritance that
need to be enlarged by the incumbents of professional roles. Older professional
roles that cannot make this kind of contribution become more mechanical
rather than professional; become trades rather than professions."6
Finally, the profession establishes autonomy for the lawyer and
shields his work from public scrutiny."
The impact of professionalism on the practice of law has re-
ceived little attention from the legal profession and sociologists.,'
Neither the legal profession nor legal education offers opportunities
to analyze the fundamental constructs underlying the legal system
or the dynamics of the "lawyering" process." The failure to explore
15. The effect has been described as follows: "Professionalization ... gives identity to
the role and solidarity to the organization. Such organizational identity and solidarity link
the professional to the 'establishment.' Once in the 'establishment,' the individual has
'arrived.'" Apter, Ideology and Discontent, in IDEOLOGY AND DiSCONmNT 15, 42 (D. Apter ed.
1964). Furthermore,
[a] profession is not a collection of individual professionals. It is something more
than the sum of its parts. It has an integrity, a "community," which characterizes it as
a profession. As William Goode has indicated, a profession is a "community within a
community." As a community, a profession can be expected to exhibit organizational
characteristics common to other forms of organized behavior.
Wallace, An Excursion into the Affinities Between Law and the Behavioral Sciences, 18 J.
LEGAL ED. 43, 47 (1965) (citing Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions,
22 AM. SOCIOL. Rav. 194 (1957)).
16. Apter, supra note 15, at 42.
17. As Howard Becker has pointed out,
[pirofessionals, in contrast to members of other occupations, claim and are often ac-
corded complete autonomy in their work. Since they are presumed to be the only judges
of how good their work is, no layman or other outsider can make any judgment of what
they can do. If their activities are unsuccessful, only another professional can say
whether this was due to incompetence or to the inevitable workings of nature or society
by which even the most competent practitioner would have been stymied. This image
of the professional justifies his demand for complete autonomy and his demand that the
client give up his own judgment and responsibility, leaving everything in the hands of
the professional.
Becker, The Nature of a Profession, in EDUCATION FOR THE PROFESSIONS 38-39 (N. Henry ed.
1962).
18. Exceptions include: Parsons, The Law and Social Control, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY
56-72 (W. Evan ed. 1962); Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in EssAYs IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 13, at 370; Parsons, A Sociologist Views the Legal
Profession, in UNIvEsrrY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, CONFERENCE ON THE PROFESSION OF LAW
AND LEGAL EDUCATION 49 (Conf. Ser. No. 11, 1953); Riesman, Toward an Anthropological
Science of Law and the Legal Profession, 57 AM. J. Soc. 121 (1951).
19. For critical analyses of legal education, see Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A
19771
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these constructs and the relationship between law and other societal
institutions has been attributed to insufficient time or to a lack of
need. Greater analysis of the profession and more self-analysis by
those engaged in the practice of law are very much needed, however.
Arguably "[o]ur professional responsibility is to confront
conventional images of what is supposed to be true with functional
images-established by appropriate research-depicting what in
fact is so.""0
The possibility of increasing awareness to gain understanding
begins with a scrutiny of role.21 In the most superficial sense "[a]
role is a pattern for conduct in a particular social position. '2  The
lawyer's role, by definition, constitutes an external influence on his
practice, because it is derived from societal forces beyond the imme-
diate control of the lawyer. The role is patterned on the demands
and expectations of those who interact with the lawyer: clients,
other attorneys, judges, and other professionals.2 3 The concept of
role, however, should not be considered without reference to the
concept of identity, which is in part internal or psychological in
nature. 4 Shaffer has noted in a previous work that "[t]he role
Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACT. 71 (1970); Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal
Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444 (1970); Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HAv. L. REv.
392 (1971); Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal
Education, U. CIN. L. REV. 93 (1968).
20. A. ROGOW & H. LASsWELL, POWER, CORRUPTION, AND RECTITUDE 67 (1963).
21. The legal literature on attorney roles is extensive. On the policymaking role, see
Educating the Lawyer as a Policy-maker, 6 TRIAL 41 (April/May 1970); Mayo, The New
Technology and National Goals: Some Implications for Legal-Policy Decision Making, 37
NOTRE DAME LAW. 33 (1961); Mayo & Jones, Legal-Policy Decision Process: Alternative
Thinking and the Predictive Function, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 318 (1964); Szanton, Public
Policy and the Law: Legal Training as 'Perverse' Preparation for Policymaking Role in Gov-
ernment, 6 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REv. 51 (1973). On the economic policymaking role, see
Donahue, Book Review, 70 MICH. L. REv. 195 (1971). On lawyers in politics, see D. RUSCHE-
MEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SocImY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSON IN GER-
MANY AND IN THE UNITED STATES 71-75 (1973); Agger, Lawyers in Politics: The Starting Point
for a New Research Program, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 434 (1956); Green, Schmidhauser, Berg, & Brady,
Lawyers in Congress: A New Look at Some Old Assumptions, 26 W. POL. Q. 440 (1973).
22. L. FRIEDMAN & S. MCCAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 824 (1969). See also
D. MELLINKOFF, LAWYERS & THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE XV-Xvi, 1-7 (1976); A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY
FOR LAWYERS 11-14 (1968); Ritzer, Professionalization, Bureaucratization and Rationaliza-
tion: The Views of Max Weber, 53 Soc. FORCES 627, 629-33 (1975); Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1975).
23. Thus to a large degree "[wihat a lawyer does is defined by the society in which he
practices. It defines the limits of his operations and imposes various expectations upon him
which he has no power to alter." Watson, supra note 19, at 104-05. The lawyer's role, then,
as viewed from the outside, in large part is determined by the society in which he or she exists.
24. The lawyer's self-identity is important and is closely related to his or her identity
as an individual. This identity is "the detailed and complex internal image which each person
must develop of himself as he matures, which becomes a kind of model by which he patterns
[Vol. 30:923
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concept is sociological-seen from the outside in; the identity con-
cept is psychological-seen from the inside out."'' In that work he
offered a clear example by which one can visualize the difference
between role and identity:
If I close my eyes and imagine a lawyer, I expose myself to a role. If I close my
eyes and see me, I expose myself to an identity. And if I close my eyes and see
myself as a lawyer, I expose myself to the conflict between my role and my
identity."
The concept of increased awareness has a further socio-
psychological component in the relationship of self to others. The
quality and direction of interpersonal relationships and the under-
standing of those relationships depends not only upon their dynamic
interactional aspects but also upon one's self-concept2 and the per-
ception that one has of others viewing self during the interaction.2s
his life." Watson, supra note 19, at 103. Norman Cameron has concluded that
[t]he self-image is a product of an infinite number of interactions with other human
beings. These interactions have in the past led, and go on leading, to internalizations of
the experiences of interaction as ego identifications and as superego identifications. The
identifications, modified or transformed by the ego or superego organization into which
they ehiter, also interact with each other within the personality system. Among other
things, the self image represents one's status as an organism, as a unit in a series of social
systems (family group, neighborhood group, school, religious and work groups), as a
person toward whom, within the different social systems mentioned, other people have
many different and conflicting attitudes, and toward whom the person himself has his
own complex attitudes.
Into the formation of the self-image the early hierarchical systems of value judg-
ments of mother, father, siblings and other close associates enter, in relation both to ego
functions and to superego functions.
N. CAMERON, PERSoNALrtn DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: A DYNAMIC APPROACH 347
(1963).
25. Shaffer, supra note 14, at 731.
26. Id.; see Hermann, Patterns of a Life in Law: A Consideration of Comtemporary
American Legal Biography, 24 DE PAUL L. Rav. 853, 859-66 (1975).
27. The lawyer will have a
picture of himself, which will largely control the manner in which he performs his
professional task. This self-image will be compounded of elements from the remote past,
technical skills mastered during the course of learning to function professionally in the
law, and many subtle tendencies which are more or less stereotyped and individualized
techniques for coping with all interpersonal relationships and the emotional themes
present therein.
Watson, The Lawyer as Counselor, supra note 14, at 7. See also Watson, The Psychology of
the Professional Self-Image, 38 CHEM. & ENGINEERING NEws 84 (Mar. 21, 1960).
28. The concept of self viewing others viewing self as stated here has been referred to
as the "recycling dyadic process." In this process
[tihe perceiver, in some sense aware of many of the general properties of the other
person (consciousness, mind) or of his specific attributes (for example, generosity), has
to allow for the fact that he himself, with similar properties, is also the object of percep-
tion and thought and that, as such, he influences his own object of perception. Observer
and observed are simultaneously observed and observer. Their reciprocal feedback pro-
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Thus the lawyer cannot scrutinize effectively himself or herself in
the absence of the contextual overlay of relational counterparts.
Lawyers interact with other lawyers, clients, authority figures (such
as judges or senior partners), parents, spouses, children, friends,
and various other significant counterparts. In the broadest sense,
awareness for the lawyer involves the scrutiny of self in a variety of
relationships of varying intensity and meaning.
Two interacting frames of reference are involved in the concept
of increased awareness. The first is derived from the interpersonal
school of psychiatry, which places primary emphasis upon the
emerging relationship between the personalities in interaction."'
The second frame of reference is from the vantage point of the
sociologist, who views the interaction between individuals as one
between players upon a stage. The sociologist defines interaction in
terms of role, status, and reference groups and allows increased
awareness based upon an intellectual understanding of these con-
cepts.
Erving Goffman, a social psychologist, has written extensively
about the sociological implications of personal interaction." Goff-
man, whose works are recommended for the lawyer interested in
self-scrutiny, argues that
every person lives in a world of social encounters, involving him either in face-
to-face or mediated contact with other participants. In each of these contacts,
he tends to act out what is sometimes called a line-that is, a pattern of verbal
and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and through
this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself. Regardless of
whether a person intends to take a line, he will find that he has done so in
effect. The other participants will assume that he has more or less willfully
taken a stand, so that if he is to deal with their response to him he must take
into consideration the impression they have possibly formed of him.',
The work of social psychologists like Goffman, operating from the
sociological frame of reference, suggests a scrutiny of interaction by
ascertaining the roles lawyers play and the special status lawyers are
accorded as individuals because of their profession.
cesses modify their self-presentation and, in turn, their reciprocal perceptions, in a
continuous recycling but varying process during which each person uses the variations
in himself and the other person as a means of validating his hypotheses about the other.
Tagiuri, Person Perception, in 3 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 395, 426 (2d ed. G.
Lindsey & E. Aronson eds. 1969).
29. Cf. H. SULLIVAN, THE PSYCHIATRIC INTERVIEW (1954).
30. The following works of Goffman are illustrative: FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974); INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS IN FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR
(1967); RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER (1971); STRATEGIC
INTERACTION (1969).
31. E. GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RrrUAL 5 (1967). See generally E. GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC
INTERACTION (1969).
[Vol. 30:923
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Sociologist Anselm Strauss has pointed out that in interactions
between lawyer and client, both the attorney and the client "per-
ceive the situation, observe what is required with respect to the
status of each and carry out the requisite or selected line of ac-
tion."32 The awareness of status in the attorney-client relationship,
however, does not describe sufficiently the complexities of the rela-
tionship. As Strauss has observed, "[tihe interactional situation is
not an interaction between two persons, merely, but a series of
transactions carried on in thickly peopled and complexly imaged
contests."33 Part of the difficulty in self-scrutiny of interpersonal
relationships is that
[flace-to-face interaction is a fluid, moving, "running" process; during its
course the participants take successive stances vis-a-vis each other. Sometimes
they fence, sometimes they move in rhythmic psychological ballet, but always
they move through successive phases of position. The initial reading of the
other's identity merely sets the stage for action, gives each some cues for the
his lines."
The primary means of studying the attorney-client relationship
is by focusing the attorney's attention upon self.3 Shaffer correctly
32. A. STRAUSS, MIRRORS AND MASKS: THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 55 (1959).
33. Id. at 56-57.
34. Id. at 55.
35. See LEGAL INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING, supra note 1, at 182. Shaffer emphasizes
the need for self-awareness throughout Legal Interviewing and Counseling. He does not at-
tempt to explore all of the labyrinth of psychological literature on the self. The term "self"
is used by different writers and schools of psychology to refer to personality, person, mind,
ego, the life theme, "I," and subjective life in general. A review of the extensive literature on
the self can be found in R. WYLm, THE SELF CONCEPT: A CRITICAL SURVEY OF PERTINENT
RESEARCH LITERATURE (1961). See also, J. DIGGORY, SELF-EVALUATION: CONCEPTS AND STUDIES
(1966). Roy Schafer has reflected on the diverse usage for the concept of self and found that
when "[ulsed this loosely, 'self' is of little use in the quest for clarity of thought." Schafer,
Action: Its Place in Psychoanalytic Interpretation and Theory, 1 THE ANNUAL OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 159, 172 (1973).
For a review of the views on self predating modem psychological formulations, see
DIGGORY, supra.
The importance of self is found in the fact that".., the career of every sentient person
is definable in terms of the building and nurturing of a self and of his selfhood." 0. TEAD,
THE ART OF ADMINISTRATION 45 (1951). Lawyers are not engaged only in "saying what the law
is, or doing things for clients that involve applying law, because ... saying or doing 'under
law' is involving one's self, necessarily, in the complexity of lego-ethical experience." W.
PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 211 (1972).
The process by which one explores self will be referred to as self-scrutiny or self-
awareness: For an example of the process of self-awareness employed in the classroom as a
method in teaching counseling techniques, see Watson, Professionalizing the Lawyer's Role
as Counselor: Risk-Taking for Rewards, 1969 LAw & Soc. ORD. 17, 29-33. Freeman and
Weihofen have assessed the value of self-awareness to effective counseling:
If he is to be really good in the art of counseling the lawyer must know himself, must
know his own reactions to various situations and to the people with whom he communi-
19771
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notes that lawyers spend too much time looking at the client's side
of the relationship and thereby avoid their own feelings as lawyers
and as human beings. 6 "In the practicing of law," he writes, "one
has to find out about the person doing as well as the person done
to."3 Self-awareness can be used as the basis for increased aware-
ness of others" and of the attorney-client relationship in general.
Awareness of the "rhythmic psychological ballet" of interper-
sonal relationships is hardly possible if one views only the roles we
play, and Shaffer's Legal Interviewing and Counseling is not so
limited. The author explores a number of promising techniques that
promise the lawyer greater awareness of interpersonal relations. His
fundamental suggestion for achieving greater awareness is the ob-
servation of certain aspects of one's own behavior that suggest the
need for caution. What can the lawyer look for within himself or
herself to indicate the need for greater self-awareness? Shaffer re-
minds us that barometers of a need for greater awareness include:
-Feelings of discomfort during or after interviews with the client ...
-Carelessness and discourtesy toward the client, such as being late for
appointments, permitting avoidable interruption, or making appointment ar-
rangements which are inconvenient for the client ....
-Strong affectionate feelings for the client ... [especially a client] of
the opposite sex ....
-Avoidance of the client and neglect of his case ....
-Gossip with others about the client ....
-Boredom or drowsiness .... 39
cates ... [and] he should strive to know himself well enough to be aware of his own
sensations, to acknowledge thefin, and then try to discover the reasons for them. If he
can do this, he has at his command a most useful facility for gaining rapport with his
client-understanding his own patterns of reaction to the client's emotional vibrations.
FREEMAN & WEIHOFEN, supra note 12, at 98-99.
36. LEGAL INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING, supra note 1, at 184.
37. Id. at 5. "When you want to recognize and understand what takes place in the minds
of others, you have first to look into yourself." T. REIK, THE SEARCH WITHIN: THE INNER
EXPERIENCE OF A PSYCHOANALYST 255 (1956). "No deep insight into human minds is possible
without unconscious comparison with our own experiences. The decisive factor in understand-
ing the meaning and the motives of human emotions and thoughts is something in the person
of the observer .. " Id. at 263.
38. Richard Abel, the new editor of the Law and Society Review, has called for research
in the relationship between lawyers and social change. He asks,
What have been the consequences of the indubitable change in the consciousness of
lawyers which transpired during the last decade? How differently do lawyers now con-
ceive of their role? How is this conception affected by background, by law school experi-
ence, by the nature of the market for legal services, by work experience? What new
institutional forms are available to lawyers who wish to play nontraditional roles, and
how effective are each of these structures in advancing social change?
Abel, From the Editor-Elect, 10 LAw & Soc'y REv. 489, 493 (1976).
39. LEGAL INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING, supra note 1, at 204-06.
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Shaffer also suggest nonverbal communication, or body lan-
guage, as another means of increasing awareness." The study of
nonverbal behavior in interpersonal relationships offers the lawyer
a valuable analytical tool not only for observation of others but for
self-observation as well.4 The pioneering works of Edward T. Hall 2
and Raymond L. Birdwhistel4 3 suggest that body language can be
used by the lawyer as a tool to gather fuller meaning of a client's
communications. Nonverbal communication permits the perceptive
lawyer to gain greater awareness of the underlying feelings and emo-
tions that arise in an ongoing interpersonal relationship.44 Body lan-
guage also can be used in negotiations between lawyers, in attorney-
client relationships, and in settings in which the lawyer is interact-
ing with judges and juries.
A second technique explored by Shaffer to analyze interper-
sonal relations is transactional analysis (TA),15 a form of conscious
level self-observation that can help the attorney understand his
relationships with clients and with others." TA is both an analytical
framework for categorizing individual emotional states during the
course of communication and a popularized form of psychotherapy.
TA attempts to explain interpersonal relationships in terms of po-
40. Id. at 130-33.
41. Useful studies of nonverbal behavior include: M. ARGYLE, SOCIAL INTERACTION
(1969); R. BIRDWHISTELL, INTRODUCTION TO KINESICS: AN ANNOTATION SYSTEM FOR ANALYSIS OF
BODY MOTION AND GESTURE (1952); R. GORDON, FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS
AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS 51, 57-59 (1975); E. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION
(1966); E. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE (1959); A. LOWEN, PHYSICAL DYNAMICS OF CHARACTER
STRUCTURE; BODILY FORM AND MOVEMENT IN ANALYTIC THERAPY (1958); NON-VERBAL
COMMUNICATION (R. Hinde ed. 1972); J. RUESCH & W. KEES, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION:
NOTES ON THE VISUAL PERCEPTION OF HUMAN RELATIONS (1956); A. SCHEFLEN, BODY LANGUAGE
AND THE SOCL ORDER: COMMUNICATION AS BEHAVIORAL CONTROL (1972); Allen, The Dynamics
of Interpersonal Communication and the Law, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 135, 173-75 (1964).
42. See, e.g., E. HALL, THE HmDEN DIMENSION (1966).
43. See, e.g., R. BIRDWHISTELL, INTRODUCTION TO KINESICS, supra note 41. The popular-
ized version of the Hall and Birdwhistell findings was presented in J. FAST, BODY LANGUAGE
(1970).
44. A. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING PROCESS 53-69 (1976).
45. LEGAL INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING, supra note 1, at 229-33.
46. A popular guide to transactional analysis that lawyers should find useful is T.
HARRIS, I'M OK-You'RE OK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS (1966). Both
Harris and Berne have identified sufficiently the basic characteristics of the Parent, Adult,
and Child ego states and have demonstrated that they easily are learned by individuals
unskilled in psychotherapy. Once the Parent, Adult, and Child modes in which communica-
tion is initiated and received are identified, communication can be affected by making a
conscious effort to change the ego state. The Parent, Adult, and Child ego states are some-
what analogous to the superego, ego, and id of the structural theory presented by Sigmund
Freud. As Berne has noted, "script analysis is Freudian, but it is not psychoanalytic." E.
BERNE, WHAT Do You SAY AFTER YOU SAY HELLO? THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN DESTINY 58
(1972).
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tential ego states from which communication (and action) are trans-
mitted and received.4 7 A content analysis of interpersonal communi-
cations led Eric Berne, the founder of transactional analysis, to
develop a classificatory scheme that can provide insight into mes-
sage communications. Berne observed that all communications take
place from either a Parent, Adult, or Child ego state. The Parent,
Adult, and Child ego states were found to be common in both the
initiating and the responding communication. All interactions can
be diagrammed as stimuli and responses between ego states.
The paternalism reflected in many traditional attorney-client
relationships would be diagrammed:
P P
A
C
Atty. Client
The patterns of interaction derived from extended communica-
tion and behavior between Parent (P), Adult (A), and Child (C),
ego states constitute "games"4 and collectively make up the indi-
vidual's "life script." Participants in the interaction must analyze
only the content of their communication and, unlike other forms of
psychotherapy, not its underlying motivation.
47. See E. BERNE, TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: A SYSTEMATIC INDIVIDUAL
AND SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 17-20, 22 (1961).
48. Id. at 23. For an examination of a variety of these "games," see E. BERNE, GAMES
PEOPLE PLAY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS (1964).
49. The term "life-script" was used by Berne to denote the repetitive nature of the
"games people play." Berne described the life-script as "an going life plan formed in early
childhood under parental pressure. It is the psychological force which propels the person
toward his destiny, regardless of whether he fights it or says it is his own free will." E. BERNE,
supra note 46, at 32. Individuals "carry their scripts and their counterscripts around in their
heads in the form of Parental voices telling them what to do and not do, and the aspirations
in the form of Child pictures of how they would like it to be, and among the three of them
they put their shows on the road." Id. at 53. See generally C. STEINER, SCRIPTS PEOPLE LIVE;
TRANSACTIONAL ANAYLSIs OF IAFE ScRIPTs (1974).
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Two threshold questions in the effort to increase attorney self-
awareness are whether lawyers have special needs that are fulfilled
by practicing law and whether these needs, conscious and uncon-
scious, may bring individuals into the profession.-" The emotional
gratification that lawyers derive from their professional role as law-
yers has not been explored fully.51 The very nature of professional-
ism, however, suggests that lawyers are involved intimately with
power and control within society. Myers McDougal recently de-
scribed the central aspect of the practice of law as being a
"specialist on authority and control. 52 McDougal further notes that
[t]he function of the lawyer is to assist in the establishment and maintenance
of the totality of a community's public order-reduce the number of decisions
taken by mere naked power, to manage authority and control in a way that
will maximize the production and sharing of all values, and to increase the
civic domain in which people are free from all forms of coercion. 53
Ironically enough, individuals may select law as a profession in
response to unconscious emotional needs. 4 Andrew Watson has
found that law becomes one's vocation in part "because it gives
them [lawyers] opportunities to operate from a position of power
and authority, as they organize, conceptualize, and manipulate the
social forces known as law."51 5 Beyond the power drive, Watson
found
a powerful desire to be helpful to others and thus secure a supply route
to sources of approval, affection, or love. All human beings need such guaran-
tees of attachment to the group, and professional activities are one of the surest
sources of supply for this need."
Watson also observed "the wish to create orderliness in ideas, insti-
tutions, and relationships"57 and noted that "perhaps some of this
need for order, still rests latently in most, where it may occasionally
cause problems through forcing premature decisions about clients,
their needs, and their wishes.""8 Finally, Watson ascribed to the
50. LEGAL INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING, supra note 1, at 194-206; see Reisman, supra
note 18, at 131.
51. An exception is Leete, Francia, & Strawser, A Look at Lawyers' Need Satisaction,
57 A.B.A.J. 1193 (1971) (discussed in Legal Interviewing and Counseling at 196-200).
52. McDougal, Beware the Squid Function, 1 LEARNING AND THE LAW 16, 18 (Spring
1974).
53. Id.
54. See Nachmann, Childhood Experience and Vocational Choice in Law, Dentistry,
and Social Work, 7 J. COUNSELING PSYCH. 243 (1960); Thielens, Some Comparisons of En-
trants to Medical and Law School, 11 J. LEGAL ED. 153, 159-63 (1958).
55. Watson, The Lawyer as Counselor, 5 J. FPm. L. 7, 9 (1965).
56. Id. at 10.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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attorney a wish for certainty and order that becomes additional
"psychological components of the lawyer's self-image ...."I'
The personality of the lawyer also plays an influential role in
the attorney-client relationship and in the resolution of legal prob-
lems."0 For example, Robert Redmount has noted that the attorney
. . . may seek to induce his client to take demanding action, conciliatory
action, or no action at all. He may inspire his client to more or less militancy.
He may stress the opportunity, or lack of it, for economic gain or recoupment.
Or he may argue the virtures of personal and moral integrity. He may counsel
his client to conciliatory behavior, whether from personal conviction and dis-
position or because of crass or stern professional judgments about the client's
situation. He may handle his adversary contentiously, with tact and consider-
ation, with contempt, or with fear. He may be amiable toward him, or hostile
and suspicious. He is, withal, a tactician, but one whose dispositions and
judgments must reveal something of the predominating personality that lies
within."
By coming to grips with the subjective impact of one's self on the
attorney-client relationship, Shaffer contends, the attorney can
avoid "the peril of being manipulated" by his or her own personal-
ity.
6 2
Shaffer's concern with self-awareness is an integral aspect of his
humanistic approach to the practice of law, which emphasizes the
growth and development of the client and the attorney as individu-
als. The focus throughout Shaffer's work is that the lawyer is a
unique being whose personal significance lies both within and be-
yond the legal profession. An integral aspect of the humanistic ap-
proach to law, lawyers, and law practice is the need to achieve
greater self-insight, insight into the interrelation of self to others,
and insight into the relation of self to society and of society to self.
Through awareness, Shaffer maintains, lawyers attain the necessary
knowledge to become humanistic counselors.
The essential problem is that a lawyer's legal education and
training "does not necessarily make him an educated man," for his
specialist knowledge may be of only limited influence on the forma-
tive aspects of decision-making and largely "unrelated to true self-
knowledge." 6 3 Harold Lasswell, one of the foremost interdisciplinary
59. Id.
60. LEGAL INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING, supra note 1, at 301-02.
61. Redmount, Attorney Personalities and Some Psychological Aspects of Legal Consu-
lation, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 972, 973 (1961). See also Redmount, supra note 8, at 83-84.
62. LEGAL INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING, supra note 1, at 301. See generally WATSON,
supra note 44, at 29-31, 42, 79-88, 93-113, 154.
63. A. MITSCHERLICH, SOCIETY WITHOUT THE FATHER: A CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 17 (1969).
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legal scholars, has stated that the purpose of self-scrutiny is the
clarification, formulation, adoption, and employment of
"procedures whose principal role is to prepare the thinker to endure
or attain a higher level of rationality." 4 He further observed that
"[i]f rationality includes the notion of freedom of choice and hence
of freedom from obsession and compulsivity, it is obvious that ra-
tional thinking requires the use of appropriate procedures by means
of which the thinker obtains access to pertinent facts about the
Self." 5
The process of gaining increased awareness has both theoretical
and practical implications for the lawyer6 and for the jurispruden-
tial scholar. 7 The first goal of self-awareness, then, is to liberate the
practice of law and the legal decision-maker from influences that are
not readily obvious. The underlying premise is that factors out of
awareness affect both the process and the end product of one's par-
ticipation in the legal system. An awareness of the role that these
conscious and unconscious factors play in legal decison-making is
essential, therefore, for any attorney concerned with decisions in-
64. Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment: Principles of Content and Procedure, 1
INQUIRY 87, 96 (1958).
65. Id. at 92.
66. Some of these implications have been enumerated by Meltsner and Schrag:
Anaylsis of the interpersonal transactions between students, clients and other actors in
the legal process may serve a variety of ends, such as enabling students better to predict
and control their actions in a professional context; sensitizing them to social cues and
non-verbal communications; helping them to be aware of their own anger, passivity,
concern, distrust and other feelings about lawyering and of how those feelings affect what
they do.
Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 11, at 585; cf. Kelso, Steps Toward a Lawyer Oriented Juris-
prudence: Problems, Promises, Procedures, and Pitfalls, 19 U. FiA. L. Ray. 522 (1966-1967).
67. The role of self-scrutiny should be obvious if
. . . what we think of as theories are in fact personal orientations to all or part of reality.
No matter how impersonally phrased, a theory has its origins in an individual faced with
an array of phenomena. It is only this that permits a difference of opinion about theories
along with full accord on the facts. In this view, logical implication is not a property of
propositions but of a relationship between proposition and person. A theory is always
an ordering of facts into figure and ground, important and unimportant, and such as
ordering may follow from personal predilections and emotional investments as well as
from the dictates of reality.
Church, Language and the Discovery of Reality, in LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS 918 (W.
Bishin & C. Stone eds. 1972).
68. Personal unconscious biases are perhaps the best example:
Unconscious biases act like filters between our perceptions and our intellects. They
enable us to screen out observations that do not fit in with our preconceived notions and
to see causal relationships where none exist. Worst of all, they blind us to their own
presence so that we are quick to defend our erroneous hypotheses with shouts of "I saw
it with my own eyes!"
A. WEIL, THE NATURAL MIND 9 (1972).
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volving important value preferences." Greater awareness through
self-scrutiny serves not only as an analytical tool to the lawyer and
scholar but produces benefits separate and apart from any profes-
sional use. Karen Homey, founder of a major school of psychoanaly-
tic thought, has pointed out that
[alttempts at constructive self-analysis can be important in the first place,
for the individual himself. Such an endeavor gives him a chance for self-
realization, and by this I mean not only the development of special gifts that
he may have been inhibited from utilizing but also, even more important, the
development of his potentialities as a strong and integrated human being, free
from crippling compulsions.'0
Another observei, George Wald, has concluded that "[olne cannot
examine what is going on in the self without the examination's being
a new experience, enlarging and changing the self that is under
observation."7' A likely direct and natural result of this process of
self-scrutiny is movement toward the maximization of human po-
tentialities.
One of the most challenging tasks for the lawyer, and for any
individual, is the realization of full potential growth as an individ-
ual human being. The task is made more difficult because of our
professional status as lawyers. A number of questions are raised by
the lawyer's quest for self-realization. What kind of impediments
does the practice of law create for psychological growth?72 What
meaning do we attach to law practice and how does that meaning
affect our psychological growth? How can we perform as lawyers and
69. The ultimate barrier in decision-making is lack of awareness. This is generally true
whether the decision-making is individual or organizational in nature. In the case of organiza-
tional decision-making the term refers simply to the inability to know all of the options or
alternatives that would be workable. This may result from a failure in organizational commu-
nication or simply from inadequate generative means for securing the information. Similar
factors are present in individual decision-making in that barriers arise from the psychological
defense mechanisms that have the adaptive function of fitting the individual for his or her
day-to-day existence. See generally, A. FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENCE
(1946) (summarized in Allen, supra note 41, at 164-69). A description of a human relations
training program for law students using both small groups and individual psychodynamics
can be found in Sacks, Human-Relations Training for Law Students and Lawyers, 11 J. LEGAL
ED. 316 (1959).
70. K. HORNEY, SnF-ANAysis 10 (1942).
71. Wald, Determinancy, Individuality, and the Problem of Free Will, in NEW VIEWS
OF THE NATURE OF MAN 16, 41 (J. Platt ed. 1965).
72. The practice of law presents special problems that may act as obstacqes to growth.
Lawyers live their work; thus the clich6 that the law is a "jealous mistress." Lawyers' lives
tend to be crowded, rushed, and complex, characteristics that in turn interfere with their
ability to see who they are, what they do, and where they are going. Success in the status-
prestige game tends to blind lawyers to "what is going on in the real world." (How can lawyers
experience success without being caught up in it?) Finally, the profession subjects lawyers to
stress (physiological and psychological), which further isolates them from the inner self.
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grow psychologically and interpersonally? Can lawyers achieve con-
gruence in their personal and professional lives? 3 Can humanistic
legal education be used to promote the lawyer's quest for self-
actualization?74 Will the legalistic paradigm continue to structure
the attorney-client relationship?" Professor Shaffer had not an-
swered nor attempted to answer such questions in Legal Interview-
ing and Counseling. He has provided, however, a theoretical and
practical frame of reference for exploring the psycho-social aspects
of law practice, the lawyer as an individual, the lawyer as a profes-
sional, and the lawyer as individual and professional in society. 7
73. The following discussion seems to present the most salient points of concern:
[Ejven if on balance the role-differentiated character of the lawyer's way of thinking
and acting is ultimately deemed to be justifiable within the system on systemic instru-
mental grounds, it still remains the case that we do pay a social price for that way of
thought and action. For to become and to be a professional, such as a lawyer, is to
incorporate within oneself ways of behaving and ways of thinking that shape the whole
person. It is especially hard, if not impossible, because of the nature of the professions,
for one's professional way of thinking not to dominate one's entire adult life. Thus, even
if the lawyers who were involved in Watergate were not, strictly speaking, then and there
functioning as lawyers, their behavior was, I believe, the likely if not inevitable conse-
quence of their legal acculturation. Having been taught to embrace and practice the
lawyer's institutional role, it was natural, if not unavoidable, that they would continue
to play that role even when they were somewhat removed from the specific institutional
milieu in which that way of thinking and acting is arguably fitting and appropriate. The
nature of the professions-the lengthy educational preparation, the prestige and eco-
nomic rewards, and the concomitant enhanced sense of self-makes the role of profes-
sional a difficult one to shed even in those obvious situations in which that role is neither
required nor appropriate. In important respects, one's professional role becomes and is
one's dominant role, so that for many persons at least they become their professional
being. This is at a minimum a heavy price to pay for the professions as we know them
in our culture, and especially so for lawyers. Whether it is an inevitable price is, I think,
an open question, largely because the problem has not begun to be fully perceived as
such by the professionals in general, the legal profession in particular, or by the educa-
tional institutions that train professionals.
Wasserstrom, supra note 22, at 15.
74. See Savoy, supra note 19; J. Himmelstein, Reassessing Law School-An Inquiry
Into the Application of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law (unpub-
lished paper presented at Society of American Law Teachers Conference, Dec. 3-4, 1976).
75. Events of recent years raise the possibility that legalism as a world view may be
subject to further attack. One must surely question whether the traditional images and
symbols of the practice of law are secure. Are such images currently providing form and
meaning for significant numbers of law students? Are we watching the demise of the para-
digm of legalism via the public-interest lawyer who identifies with a cause and clients instead
of the legal establishment? Can legalism survive the influx of women who, after years as token
figures in our profession, have a different image of their potential life in law? Can the mascu-
line orientation (hard, tough, "cool," rational) survive an androgynized legal profession?
76. The task of evaluating and critically scrutinizing the lawyer's role in society is in
its infancy. One layman, Daniel Berrigan, has argued that professionals "must ask them-
selves if they are responding to the needs of people for medical care or legal assistance or
spiritual energy-rather than giving them a hypnotically pacifying ritual." D. BERRIGAN, THE
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Shaffer suggests a new paradigm for law practice that is not
based on rigid control of clients in an impersonal attorney-client
relationship. He argues forcefully that disregard for the client's
emotions ignores important "facts" that can be used in the law
office and the legal process. Shaffer's work suggests the possibility
of gaining personal satisfaction and of providing more adequate
legal services by actively counseling and understanding clients.
Such a humanistic approach to the practice of law can be rooted
only in an awareness of the psychological and social defenses erected
against both the attorney's clients and the attorney's impact on
society. Attorneys must learn to deal with the human emotions and
feelings of clients primarily through managing their own greatest
fear-the fear of knowing who they truly are. Shaffer's prescription
for law practice allows attorneys to ground and center themselves
in "authentic" human experience through their work with clients.
Legal Interviewing and Counseling offers a preliminary blueprint for
that process.
GEOGRAPHY OF FAITH: CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN DANIEL BERRIGAN, WHEN UNDERGROUND, AND
ROBERT COLES 103-04 (1971). This question cannot be approached until the legal profession
and the "lawyering" role are submitted to fuller scrutiny and evaluation.
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